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Introduction: Youth bulges, 
employment and insecurity
The rapid and sustained increase in the number of young 
people in the global south is one of today’s most signifi-
cant demographic trends. Around 90 percent of young 
people reside in developing countries (Shankar 2010). 
By 2030 Africa is projected to have as many youth as East 
Asia and by 2050 could also exceed the youth population 
in South Asia (Garcia and Fares, 2008). Young people make 
up approximately 30 percent of the total population in 
African countries, and this is increasing fast (Panday 
2006). Growing numbers of young people entail a process 
of demographic change within societies; ‘rejuvenation’ 
in a literal sense. Thus, in 2005, 76 percent of the Zambian 
population were under 30 years of age, with those 
between 20 and 29 years accounting for a mere 18 
percent (CSO 2007, p.12 in: Locke and Verschoor 2007). 
Whereas some expert commentators are pessimistic 
about the prospects for economic growth and poverty 
reduction in Africa (e.g. Collier 2008), youth bulges are 
recognised by many as a window of opportunity. They 
are seen to potentially offer a demographic dividend: 
where a larger workforce with fewer dependents could 
generate strong economic growth (Fares and Garcia, 
2008; Gunatilake et al, 2010). Yet, experiences to date are 
mixed: while in East Asia, the policy and institutional 
environment facilitated the harnessing of the demo-
graphic dividend to achieve strong growth, similar demo-
graphic dynamics in Latin America failed to yield better 
economic outcomes (Fares and Garcia, 2008).
Youth bulges are however also associated with severe 
levels of unemployment and youth are seen as amongst 
the ‘most vulnerable and most powerless [groups, ed.] 
in labour markets’ (Youth Employment Network undated, 
p.12) and the recent global economic crisis has hit youth 
hardest (Shankar 2010). The problem of youth unemploy-
ment has been particularly severe in Africa, where at 21 
percent it is much higher than the world average (14.4 
percent) (UNECA 2005). Moreover, young people experi-
ence disproportionately high levels of unemployment, 
and often experience age-based discrimination in labour 
markets (UN, 2005). Thus, in Sri Lanka, youth made up 
nearly 80 percent of all unemployed in 2006, and were 
almost eight times more likely to be unemployed than 
adults. Thailand’s ratio of unemployed youth (15–24 
years) to unemployed adults was 6 to 1; Indonesia’s, 5.6 
to 1; and the Philippines’, 3.4 to 1 (Gunatilake, 2010, p. 
1). Also in Africa, ‘young people have much higher unem-
ployment rates, operate more in the informal economy, 
have lower wages, and have more precarious jobs than 
adults’ (Keune and Monticone 2004). Ironically, while both 
health and educational status of African youth are better 
than ever (Garcia and Fares, 2008)1 the ‘educated unem-
ployed’ are now seen as a new and distinct social category 
(Jeffrey 2008; Jeffrey 2010). 
As urbanisation processes are accelerating in much 
of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, the combination of youth 
bulges and widespread unemployment are also often 
associated with insecurity, urban social unrest and polit-
ical instability (Panday 2006; Urdal and Hoelscher 2009; 
Frederiksen 2010).2 Thus, a UN Security Council mission 
to West Africa reported in 2003 that ‘In every county 
visited, the mission heard about the problem of unem-
ployment, particularly among young people, and how 
this was a perennial source of instability in West Africa’. 
Furthermore, a report of the UN Secretary General 
(S/2006/922) stressed that in Sierra Leone the problem 
of youth unemployment and marginalisation remained 
the most immediate threat to the country’s stability, while 
President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal called youth 
employment a ‘matter of national security’. Similarly, a 
Rwandan State Secretary argued that ‘A lot of Rwanda’s 
problems in the past have had to do with young people 
who are uneducated, unemployed, and unemployable. 
This meant that they were fertile ground for manipulation 
and for misuse by the selfish politicians that led to the 
1994 genocide’ (Youth Employment Network undated). 
Undoubtedly, the 2011 Arab Spring has reaffirmed such 
perspectives on the threat of large numbers of unem-
ployed and impoverished youth to prevailing political 
orders.  
Consequently, there is growing recognition that devel-
opmental policies must, at a minimum, cater to the needs 
and aspirations of youth. Thus, the UN has declared the 
period from 12 August 2010 – 11 August 2011 as the 
International Year of Youth, with as its slogan ‘Our youth, 
our voice’.  Similarly, 2008 was the African Youth Year, 
while the African Union declared 2009-2019 as the 
decade of youth development in Africa. Moreover, young 
people’s effective engagement in policy processes is seen 
as a means to channel their energy, passions and frustra-
tions in a more beneficial manner. This paper accordingly 
aims to assess the extent of, roles and experiences of 
young people’s involvement in policy processes in sub-
Saharan Africa. While from a Future Agriculture 
Consortium perspective the ultimate interest is in relation 
to policy processes associated specifically with the agri-
food sector, such sector specific information is very 
limited. The paper therefore assesses young people’s 
involvement in policy processes in sub-Saharan Africa 
more generally.
Definitional issues around youth  are addressed in the 
next section, and then the paper moves on to discuss 
national youth policy; the issue of and dominant argu-
ments used to promote youth involvement; and the 
extent and effects of youth involvement in policy 
processes. The paper then reflects on the ways in which 
policy processes are conceptualized in some dominant 
policy discourses in international arenas, and how this 
may limit the focus on some forms of youth politics. 
Finally a number of questions are identified that may 
need more foregrounding in order to enhance under-
standing of youth in policy processes. 
Children, youth and young 
people
While youth is increasingly seen as a specific social cate-
gory ‘laden with risk and uncertainty’ (UNESCO 2004, 
p.6), there are no internationally agreed definitions that 
clearly identify which people should be considered to 
be youth, and how they are distinguished from children 
and adults. A bewildering range of definitions and 
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working definitions are used, often organised around 
age but sometimes around alternative sets of culturally 
specific criteria. Consequently, one needs to be very 
cautious about such definitional intricacies when 
comparing studies and reports.
Where youth is defined in age based terms actual age 
ranges vary. For instance, the official UN definition of 
youth refers to people in the age bracket 15-24 years, 
while UNESCO defines ‘young people’ to be between 
10-19 years old (UNESCO 2004). UNICEF identifies ‘adoles-
cents’ (10-18 years), while the UN Convention on Child 
Protection considers all people up to the age of 18 as 
‘children’. Thus, someone in the 15-18 age range, can be 
considered a ‘youth’, a ‘child’, but also a ‘young person’. 
The African Youth Charter promulgated in 2006 by the 
African Union considers that youth are people between 
15 – 35 years of age. Moreover, various other definitions 
abound. Some countries define youth from birth while 
others apply the term up to the age of 40 (UNESCO 2004). 
Similarly, the academic literature employs a range of 
definitions. For instance, whereas Arunatilake and 
Jayawardena, 2010 (in Gunatilake et al, pp. 19-48) define 
youth as persons aged 15 to 29, and adults as persons 
aged 30 and over, Jeffrey (2009, p.2) defines ‘children’ as 
those aged 5–15, ‘youth’ as those aged 16–30, and use 
the term ‘young people’ to refer to children and youth 
collectively. 
Moreover, definitions organised around the principle 
of age may be insensitive to culturally specific notions 
of youth, childhood and adulthood. Thus, Kallio and Hakli 
(2010) argue that ‘we can not define children or child-
hood on the basis of age because a ‘child’ is not the same 
everywhere. Childhood may be universal as a phenom-
enon but the position of a child is formed in relation to 
culturally and geographically specific institutions, tradi-
tions and forms of family life’ (Kallio and Hakli 2010, p.357). 
While recognising that definitions of who counts as 
youth need to refer to local cultural notions and may 
thus be country specific, international bodies still like to 
assume that countries’ adoption of definitions in policy 
is guided by age, e.g. the average age at which people 
are expected to play adult roles in their communities 
(Youth Employment Network undated). Moreover, it has 
been suggested that at least one common and universally 
shared element is that youth is a transitional concept 
(UNESCO 2004). 
Yet, even this may require contextual nuance. A recent 
literature review on transitions to adulthood in devel-
oping countries (Lloyd, 2006, p.1; UN, 2005) shows that 
this transition should not necessarily be seen as linear, 
and may need to be more dynamically defined. It recog-
nises that a young person’s transition to adulthood takes 
place on multiple axes through ‘boundary events’, 
concerning: school/occupation3, family/matrimony 
(Galland, 1996 in Calves et al, 2009; MacDonald et al, 
2001) and citizenship (Lloyd, 2006). A critical observation 
in this respect is that the very social, matrimonial, family, 
residential and citizenship factors that condition an indi-
vidual’s passage to adult life have recently shown great 
fluidity. For instance, Lloyd (2006, p.2) notes that 
compared to the early 1990s, young people in developing 
countries are nowadays: entering adolescence earlier 
and healthier; more likely to spend their adolescence in 
school; more likely to delay marriage and childbearing; 
and more likely to have a postponed entry to the labour 
force. With respect to the latter, an emerging literature 
on young people’s transition from school to work (e.g. 
Garcia and Fares, 2008; World Bank, 2009) notes the range 
and the lengthening of the duration of the period 
between the end of education and first paid work for 
young Africans. This process may take anything from one 
year (Côte d’Ivoire) to five years (e.g. Cameroon, Ethiopia, 
The Gambia, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia) or more (e.g. 
seven years in Mozambique - Garcia and Fares, 2008, p. 
xxviii).4 
Consequently, recent studies have argued that transi-
tions to adulthood now show greater variety between 
individuals (or cohorts) than ever before, with highly 
individualised and fuzzy trajectories, and are often partial, 
iterative or delayed (Calves et al., 2009).  Hence, a 34-year 
old unemployed and unmarried man living with his 
parents may be seen as a ‘youth’, implying that cultural 
notions of youth become less compatible with age-based 
definitions. Moreover, some critiques have made the case 
for abandoning the life-stages notion that underpins 
much thinking around youth and adulthood (Johnson-
Hanks 2002). In her ethnography of the Beti community 
in Cameroon, Johnson-Hanks shows how adulthood is 
negotiable and situation/domain specific, such that a 
young girl may be deemed an adult by her parents in 
one domain (e.g. finding her way around town) but simul-
taneously youth in another (in terms of choosing a school 
for secondary studies) (Johnson-Hanks 2005). 
In the remainder of this paper, no further attempt is 
made to disentangle categories, or to come to any sort 
of definition. However, it is prudent to once more state 
the imperative of being very cautious about such defi-
nitional intricacies when comparing findings on youth 
engagement in policy processes from various studies 
and reports.
Youth in policy processes
Generally, under-age people are recognized as both 
objects of policy making (i.e. policy for children and 
youth), and as more or less empowered participants in 
civic activities and political practices (Kallio and Hakli 
2010). The following sections discuss youth as an object 
of policy, and consider their engagement in policy 
processes, while a later section returns to the issue of 
youth politics.  
Youth policy 
In the last decade and a half, many governments in sub-
Saharan Africa (and elsewhere in the developing and 
developed world) have promulgated national youth 
policies, set out national action plans for youth, and set 
up new institutions to work on ‘youth issues’. For instance, 
the governments of Kenya, The Gambia, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia have initiated 
national youth policies and action plans, while the 
governments of e.g. Lesotho, The Gambia, Malawi, 
Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia have established 
national youth councils. Thus, Mozambique set up a 
National Youth Council in 1996, with the ‘aim to provide 
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a structured orientation and harmonisation of different 
activities developed by youth organised in associations, 
and to serve as a legitimate interlocutor between youth 
and Government’ (Commonwealth Secretariat 2010). The 
government of Tanzania is in the process of developing 
a national youth participation strategy, while Nigeria 
created a Youth Parliament in 2008 which is to be repli-
cated across the 36 States and 774 Local Governments 
(Commonwealth Secretariat 2010). Some examples of 
typical youth policy goals and vision statements are 
presented in Box 1. 
Some consider that the creation of ‘youth’ as a category 
in Africa is a post-colonial phenomenon promoted by 
ministries of ‘Youth Sports and Culture’ and youth wings 
of political parties, while being nowadays further under-
written by a global consumption-oriented youth culture 
(Frederiksen 2010, p.1078). However, it is unclear to what 
extent youth policies are ‘home-grown’ through the 
interactions between various domestic interest groups. 
It is likely that international organizations have had a 
role in these policymaking processes. Thus, multilateral 
and bilateral donor agencies have promoted certain 
discourses, framings and narratives regarding youth. 
Notably, they have identified youth as a ‘specific social 
category’ that is facing risk, uncertainty and pronounced 
difficulties in terms of their socio-economic, political and 
cultural inclusion (UNESCO 2004). Moreover, they have 
strongly promoted the formation of national policies, 
which have been presented as ‘indispensable’, a ‘symbol 
of society’s commitment to its young citizens’ and as ‘one 
of the highest priorities of society’ as they shape the 
present and future of a country (UNESCO 2004, p. 35; p.6; 
p.5). More so, UNESCO has argued that:
“Every country thus needs effective strategies able 
to help young people to make the right choices, 
protect them from exploitation and neglect and 
ensure their participation in all spheres of society. 
To address some of these issues and, more impor-
tantly, to take a strong stand in support of their 
young people, each country is urged to develop a 
long-term, consensus-based, integrated and 
cross-sectoral youth policy (UNESCO 2004, p.6, 
emphasis in original).
The African Youth Charter of the African Union created 
a legally binding framework for governments to develop 
supportive policies and programmes for young people 
(Panday 2006). Article 12 sets out that ‘Every [sic] State 
Parties shall develop a comprehensive and coherent 
national youth policy’ for subsequent enactment into 
law (African Union 2006).5 The UN has published biannual 
World Youth Reports since 2003, and the World 
Development Report 2007, entitled Development and 
the Next Generation, argues that public policy can expand 
the perceived opportunity sets of young people who 
during adolescence take crucial decisions with regard 
to their path in life (World Bank 2007).
Youth participation in policy processes
Internationally, there is growing recognition of the impor-
tance of youth participation in decision-making, for both 
practical reasons and as a political right (UNESCO 2004; 
Youth Employment Network undated). For instance, the 
International Labour Organisation of the UN considers 
that ‘Youth participation must lie at the centre of the 
creation of policies for youth’ (Youth Employment 
Network undated) and the Commonwealth Secretariat 
considers youth participation as ‘cardinal to development 
programming’ (Commonwealth Secretariat 2010, p.7). 
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has 
declared that ‘Youth should be given a chance to take 
an active part in the decision-making of local, national 
and global levels’.6 UNESCO posits that national youth 
policy strategies that are effective and beneficial for 
youth are above all, those that empower them to actively 
influence and shape the political agenda. Progressive 
policies, on all sorts of issues (not merely those deemed 
‘youth issues’) thus need decision-makers to work not 
only for, but with young people, and let their experiences 
inform the development of appropriate interventions 
and services (UNESCO 2004). This requires the creation 
of manifold ‘spaces of participation’, fostering exchange 
between generations, languages, cultural groups, gener-
ations and different religions (UNESCO 2004). These may 
take many institutional forms, including youth organiza-
tions; youth and school councils; youth forums and youth 
parliaments, but also refer to more one-off events and 
activities, such as youth hearings and workshops; volun-
teering; youth information services; training in youth 
participation in schools; participation in and use of media; 
and employing ICTs for information and participation 
purposes7 (UNESCO 2004). More so, formalised ongoing 
processes which bring youth and decision-makers 
together are seen to have significant advantages over 
informal and ad-hoc consultations. The former facilitate 
the building of mutual trust and inspire constructive 
engagement for improved policy-making (Youth 
Australian National Youth Policy, 1993: ‘The development and implementation of youth policy and programs should 
be based upon the following principles: Equity (recognition of the rights and associated responsibilities, of all young 
people to equality of opportunity and equitable distribution of services and resources, Participation (recognition that 
young people are participants in society and as such have a role and responsibility in making decisions which affect 
their lives), Access (access to adequate and appropriate programs and services by all young people regardless of 
gender, geographic location, social, cultural or economic circumstances)’
Kenyan National Youth Policy, 2002: ‘The goal of this policy is to promote youth participation in community and civic 
affairs and to ensure that youth programs are youth centered and engage the youth’.
Samoan National Youth Policy 2001-2010: ‘The mission… is to [..] enable the spiritual, physical, emotional, intellectual, 
social and economic well-being of Samoan youth; thereby empowering them to achieve a better quality of life for 
themselves, their family, their communities, and the nation’.
Source: UNESCO 2004, p.13
Box 1. Goals and visions of national youth policies
Working Paper 025 www.future-agricultures.org6
Employment Network undated, p.28). One such form is 
the National Youth Council, which have now been set 
up by over a 100 UN Member States. 
Since the International Youth Year in 1985, the UN 
General Assembly has defined youth participation as 
comprising four components: economic participation, 
relating to work and development; social participation, 
relating to community involvement; cultural participa-
tion, relating to the arts, cultural values and expression 
and finally, political participation, relating to decision-
making processes.  All four elements are reaffirmed in 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1989) and are central to the creation of a culture of 
respect for children and young people. The convention 
promotes the principle that they are entitled to express 
their views on all matters that affect them and to have 
those views taken seriously. Article 12 sets out participa-
tion as a procedural right – it represents the means 
through which they may take part in and influence 
processes, decisions and activities in order to achieve 
justice, influence outcomes, expose abuses of power and 
realize their rights (United Nations 2003, p.271). 
Moreover, youth participation has been encouraged 
by a number of UN General Assembly Resolutions: 
 • The World Programme of Action for Youth to the year 
2000 and beyond (WPAY) (A/RES/50/81) considers that 
the active engagement of young people themselves 
is central to its successful implementation and, accord-
ingly, affirms the full and effective participation of 
youth in society and decision-making as one of its ten 
priority areas for action. This resolution asks policy 
makers to ‘Take into account the contribution of youth 
in designing, implementing and evaluating national 
policies and plans affecting their concerns’. 
 • The UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/57/165 
(December 2002) on Promoting Youth Employment 
‘Encourages Member States to prepare national 
reviews and action plans on youth employment and 
to involve youth organizations and young people in 
this process’. 
 • The Commission for Social Development Resolution 
2006/15 on Youth Employment and the UN General 
Assembly Resolutions A/RES/60/2 (2005) and A/
RES/58/133 (2003) on Policies and Programmes 
involving Youth have various references to youth 
participation in policy making (www.un.org/youth, 
last accessed December 2010)
The African Youth Charter8 also sets out in article 11 
that State Parties shall take measures to promote active 
youth participation in society, amongst others to (African 
Union 2006):
 • Guarantee the participation of youth in parliament 
and other decision-making bodies in accordance with 
the prescribed laws;
 • Facilitate the creation or strengthening of platforms 
for youth participation in decision-making at local, 
national, regional, and continental levels of 
governance;
 • Ensure equal access to young men and young women 
to participate in decision-making and fulfil their civic 
duties.
Moreover, young people are given the right to be 
integrally involved in poverty reduction through their 
active participation in the design, implementation and 
evaluation of development strategies and policies 
(Panday 2006).
Besides participation in youth councils, several African 
countries have experimented with other forms of involve-
ment. In Malawi, young people participated in gover-
nance and development processes as board members 
of the National Youth Council, National Aids Commission, 
Youth Enterprise Development Fund, Malawi 
Development Advisory Council and Malawi Development 
Fund. Zambia’s Fifth National Development Plan included 
a chapter on Youth and Children, and this was drafted 
with inputs from young people and youth organizations 
(Commonwealth Secretariat 2010). Moreover, some 
African heads of state express clear support for youth 
involvement. For instance, Nigerian President Goodluck 
Jonathan encouraged fellow Commonwealth officials to 
‘Continue making the case for our young people - their 
meaningful participation in decision-making’ and ‘to 
mainstream youth development in our work at every 
level … placing youth development at the centre of 
development planning and focus’ (Commonwealth 
Secretariat 2010, p.18, 19). 
This recognition of the importance of young people’s 
engagement with policy extends to the agricultural 
sector. For instance, a communiqué issued at a recent 
workshop in Accra involving 30 young people from Africa, 
the Caribbean and the Pacific highlights the need for the 
meaningful institutionalisation of young people’s 
involvement in agricultural policy making, giving full 
consideration to the varying needs of young men and 
women and the different demands they face (CTA 2011). 
Already young people are engaged to some degree in 
consultative exercises regarding agricultural policies in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, Zimmermann et al (2009) 
reviewed the policy processes around CAADP and the 
African Peer Review Mechanism – two key NEPAD initia-
tives aimed at improving the performance of agriculture 
– and conclude they have a good record on stakeholder 
participation, including youth. The governments of 
Ghana and Kenya for instance created national councils 
or commissions with considerable autonomy to manage 
these processes. Whilst it is true that youth (and other) 
groups from remote rural areas may be left out, others 
note the potential that a deepening of decentralisation 
processes can have for empowering such groups 
(Mokwunye 2010). 
The argument for youth 
participation in policy 
processes
In this section we analyse the case that is made for youth 
participation in policy processes. One critical finding is 
that the arguments in favour of youth participation often 
intertwine normative and empirical arguments regarding 
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its beneficial effects, and it is not always easy to disen-
tangle these, or to assess the latter’s validity.  
Involving young people in policymaking is seen to 
enhance ownership, legitimacy and durability (UNESCO 
2004). A participative process of formulating national 
youth policy thus has the potential to identify the distinc-
tive needs and concerns of youth and to promote youth 
integration into society (UNESCO 2004). Hence, the UN 
World Programme of Action on Youth considers that the 
earlier young people are provided with opportunities to 
participate, the greater the benefits to both themselves 
and the wider society (United Nations 2003). Moreover, 
it is argued that consulting young people and drawing 
on their perceptions, knowledge and ideas are essential 
to both the development of effective public policy and 
the achievement of positive outcomes (United Nations 
2003, p.275). Thus, in case of information provision young 
people may be better able to identify appropriate 
communication formats and channels. Consulting young 
people on how public services are made available could 
ensure the identification of effective means to catering 
to their unique needs and challenges (Yeo 2008).
Another argument put forward is that young people 
should be seen as part of the solution to the difficulties 
they face, not merely a problem to be resolved by others. 
They are social actors with skills, capacities and willing-
ness to bring about constructive resolutions to their own 
problems, drawing on a unique body of experience 
(United Nations 2003, p.274, 278; Youth Employment 
Network undated). Young people, it is suggested, can 
contribute a tremendous amount of energy, passion and 
creativity (United Nations 2003; Yeo 2008). Furthermore, 
it is claimed that where governments successfully 
engaged youth, these efforts have led to better policy 
formulation, implementation and evaluation (Youth 
Employment Network undated). 
This argument is built on several premises. Firstly, it 
posits a strong disconnect between the life-worlds and 
life-experiences of adult decision-makers and youth, such 
that the former do not know what is best for the latter. 
Thus, young people have a body of experience unique 
to their situation, and they have views and ideas that 
derive from this experience (United Nations 2003; Youth 
Employment Network undated). However, ‘much of 
government policy has a direct or indirect impact on 
young people, yet it is developed and delivered largely 
in ignorance of how it will affect their day-to-day lives 
or their present and future well-being’ (United Nations 
2003, p.275). Young people lack access to most of the 
processes through which adults can articulate their 
concerns. In very few countries are youth under the age 
of 18 given the right to vote; they lack access to media 
and the courts and are rarely members of trade unions 
or professional associations that could negotiate on their 
behalf (United Nations 2003, p.272).
One consequence of this assumed disconnect is that 
adults within both the public and private spheres will 
not necessarily ensure adequate representation of young 
people’s best interests in law, policy and practice. 
Therefore, public policy often gives precedence to the 
rights and interests of parents over those of children and 
young people, even when the consequences of doing 
so may be detrimental to their welfare (United Nations 
2003, p.272). 
Moreover, growing societal complexity, due to immi-
gration, mobility and greater variety of youth lifestyles 
has been argued to make it ‘ever more difficult for those 
in authority to adequately understand youth’. Such argu-
ments have also linked to demands for a more represen-
tative bureaucracy – suggesting that governments could 
hire young civil servants as a way to increase their under-
standing and input into policy-making (Yeo 2008). 
However, how representative such new employees would 
be of wider youth populations is neither clear, nor 
guaranteed. 
More generally, youth participation is often presented 
as a ‘citizen-making device’, and in this respect, youth are 
considered as distinct from other (adult) groups. It is thus 
seen to teach (moral) responsibility, civic values, a greater 
understanding of human rights and encourages them 
to ‘become active members of a democratic society’ 
(Youth Employment Network undated, p.11) and to 
provide role models to other youth. Moreover, where 
youth organizations are involved, it is deemed important 
that these observe the principles of transparency, 
accountability, non-discrimination and mutual respect 
(United Nations 2003, p.283). Thus, the strategic goals 
of youth programmes run by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat include: ‘To strengthen the contribution of 
youth in peace building, democracy and development’ 
(Commonwealth Secretariat 2010, p.6). Moreover, 
involvement in political processes is seen to allow youth 
opportunities to develop important skills and improve 
self-confidence (United Nations 2003; United Nations 
2005; Youth Employment Network undated, p.11). 
Similarly, the African Youth Charter outlines that along-
side granting numerous rights, young people also have 
responsibilities to bear towards their families, society and 
the state. It deems of ‘paramount importance that young 
people become the custodians of their own develop-
ment, partake fully in citizenship duties, and contribute 
towards the economic development of states and Africa 
as a whole’ (Panday 2006). Such arguments show a 
distinct republican (rather than liberal) notion of 
citizenship. 
Finally, the argument is advanced that a failure to 
enhance youth participation in policy processes risks 
policy failure, crime, violence and intergenerational 
discord. Thus, successful youth policy is posited to 
depend on effective representation (Youth Employment 
Network undated, p.15). If ‘young people’s voices are not 
heard and the impact of public policy on their lives is 
not discussed in decision-making forums, their concerns 
[will] never reach the top of political agendas’. Moreover, 
‘if young people are not involved in the development of 
the laws, policies and programmes that affect them, even 
well-intentioned actions on the part of adults will often 
fail to protect their best interests’ (United Nations 2003, 
p.274). However, youth participation is also portrayed 
as being in the interest of the rest of society: exclusion 
from policymaking processes and power structures can 
create significant tensions in society which can manifest 
itself in forms that represent a serious threat to the social 
fabric, such as crime and violence. Thus, participation is 
needed to counteract the ‘immense potential social costs 
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that can be created through apathy, frustration and social 
exclusion of young people’. In the worst cases, a poor 
economic and/or social environment can foster condi-
tions in which youth without prospects are manipulated 
by leaders, and are recruited or forced into armed 
conflicts, both within their own borders and also in neigh-
bouring countries (Youth Employment Network undated, 
p.12). 
The extent and effects of youth involvement in 
policy processes
Too often youth policy and legislation is piecemeal, 
lacking a comprehensive approach to the challenges 
faced by the younger generation (UNESCO 2004). A 
recent review of 41 National Action Plans on youth 
employment noted that some governments had created 
sustainable interaction mechanisms, such as youth advi-
sory groups or a youth ‘seat’ in national coordinating 
structures that allowed for the expression of young 
people’s views and opinions in the design and imple-
mentation of policies (Youth Employment Network 
undated, p.11). Yet, ‘Far too often, the roles played by 
youth in policy processes are marginal, (Youth 
Employment Network undated, p.9). The review thus 
concluded that the majority of governments do not 
involve youth in the preparation of youth employment 
policy nor in its implementation. Indeed, it highlighted 
that only eight countries even mentioned the involve-
ment of youth in their plans. 
Moreover, where consultations had taken place, these 
were often passive, giving youth the opportunity to offer 
their ideas and opinions but rarely involving them further 
in the policy process (Youth Employment Network 
undated). Thus, while governments have started to open 
up new communication channels with young people, 
more accountability and transparency is needed in how 
their suggestions and opinions are acted upon (Yeo 
2008). 
In practice, youth are often not given equal standing 
with other stakeholders in defining policies, while very 
limited attempt is made to ensure their participation on 
a long-term basis (Youth Employment Network undated). 
Moreover, despite the broad recognition of the impor-
tance of active participation of young people in the 
process of decision-making and implementation, only 
a few countries have so far made it an integral aspect of 
national politics (UNESCO 2004, p.16). Yet, some countries 
are successfully engaging youth in policy formation 
processes (Box 2). 
Moreover, the existence of a National Youth Council 
(now in over 100 UN Member States) is no guarantee of 
adequate, effective and independent youth representa-
tion. Political linkages and financial dependence on state 
funding make youth councils vulnerable to interference, 
and being staffed with members from youth wings of 
ruling political parties (Youth Employment Network 
undated). Furthermore, resource constraints and logis-
tical considerations often mean youth consultations have 
a strong urban bias, while proceedings may only be 
conducted in the official administrative languages of the 
country, for example English rather than Swahili in East 
Africa. Consequently, the views of rural and uneducated 
poor youth (and other subgroups) may not be heard. 
Similarly, where youth consultations use particular means 
such as an e-consultation (e.g. one study of 350 youths 
in 75 countries – Yeo 2008) this is bound to privilege the 
voices of particular ‘e-literate’ groups. Such bias may be 
further reinforced by the composition of youth associa-
tions involved in consultations. Indeed, too often youth 
movements are ‘dominated by the most articulate and 
socially engaged young people, while the more marginal-
ized groups are excluded. In addition, there is a danger 
that youth movements may replicate the approach of 
many adult organizations in working for disadvantaged 
young people rather than empowering those groups to 
articulate their own concerns’ (United Nations 2003, p. 
283). 
In this respect, it may be instructive to point out that 
while the concept of youth posits a common denomi-
nator it simultaneously glosses over very real differences. 
After all, youth are not a homogeneous group. Differences 
in age, sex, experience, marital status, interests and pref-
erences, family background, income and religion, 
amongst others, can create wide gaps between the 
needs, aspirations and expectations of youth even within 
a relatively small geographical location. The opportuni-
ties and constraints they face vary widely as well, and 
these particularities could be legitimately reflected in 
public policies (Commonwealth Secretariat 2010; Youth 
Employment Network undated, p.14). 
•	 Establishment	of	a	National	Youth	Commission,	charged	with	the	elaboration	of	the	policy	and	an	action	plan.	
All	commission	members	were	youth	(14-35	years).	It	conducted	sectoral	workshops	and	focus	groups	to	
consider	strategic	policy	areas	and	invited	written	submissions	from	various	stakeholders	and	drew	from	a	range	
of	research	conducted	by	other	organisations.
•	 Organisation	of	a	National	Youth	Summit,	drawing	together	more	than	200	delegates	from	major	youth,	political	
and	community	associations	to	discuss	the	framework	and	policy	direction.
•	 Launching	an	extensive	process	of	consultation	consisting	of	35	Youth	Hearings	in	rural	and	urban	settings	all	
over	the	country	and	Provincial	Youth	Summits	involving	more	than	1,400	people.
•	 Initiating	a	meeting	of	some	167	representatives	from	major	youth	and	political	organizations	and	government	
bodies	to	review	the	first	draft	of	the	national	youth	policy	and	make	amendments	based	on	their	
recommendations.
•	 Drawing	on	international	experience	for	a	holistic	national	youth	policy.
Source: UNESCO	2004,	p.15
Box 2. Developing a national youth policy in post-apartheid South Africa (1996-97) 
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Even those international bodies that promote youth 
participation sometimes struggle to uphold their own 
ideals. For instance, a review of the youth programme 
of the Commonwealth Secretariat also noted that ‘There 
is currently limited direct youth connectivity with CYP 
programme areas. Youth must be at the centre of CYP 
work and not just as beneficiaries’ (Commonwealth 
Secretariat 2010, p.7). Similarly, a leader of a youth inter-
faith group reported that at the 2010 United Nations 
Alliance of Civilizations Forum youth engagement was 
a focal point. Financial support for attendance was 
provided and a Youth Forum organized in the days 
leading up to the conference. The recommendations from 
the Youth Forum were to be read during the main plenary 
session, addressing the present world leaders, such as 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, President Lula da 
Silva of Brazil, Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey, who in 
their speeches heralded the voice of the youth. However, 
to the outrage of youth participants, a decision was 
suddenly made to cancel the youth recommendations 
at the end of the session. The world leaders essentially 
said, ‘We need to listen to the voice of the youth’ to 
blatantly ignore it only minutes later, affirming a sense 
among the youth that they were being patronized and 
disregarded (Fredericks 2010). 
Young people themselves also identify barriers to 
participation that exist within cultures, within govern-
ments, and among young people themselves. They 
consider that there are few genuine opportunities for 
participation, that many adults harbour stereotypes of 
youth as apathetic and lazy and that governments and 
adults often do not consider them ready to contribute 
constructively to policy design and development (Yeo 
2008). 
Effective participation is often hindered by engrained 
attitudes to policy processes as expert driven and by 
institutionalised prejudice by governments and policy-
makers towards youth as lacking expertise, experience, 
capacity or drive (Youth Employment Network undated, 
p.9). This problem may be particularly severe for 
15–18-year-olds, who further lack an electoral franchise 
in most countries. Respecting the right of this younger 
group to be heard represents an enormous challenge to 
traditional attitudes in most societies (United Nations 
2003), and particularly in those that are highly patriarchal 
or highly stratified (Youth Employment Network 
undated). Cultural notions that emphasise a close rela-
tionship between seniority and authority may thus mili-
tate against more egalitarian notions that often underpin 
the argument for youth participation in policy processes.
Moreover, when willing, decision-makers may lack 
knowledge and skills about how to increase involvement 
of young people in the institutions and decisions that 
affect their lives (Youth Employment Network undated). 
Effective youth participation requires changes in how 
societies perceive young people (United Nations 2005) 
and adults thus need to learn to work more closely in 
collaboration with youth to help them articulate their 
needs and develop strategies to enhance their well-being 
(United Nations 2003, p.272). In the words of one youth 
leader: ‘until more non-youth leaders turn to the youth 
as equitable partners in addressing religious and cultural 
tension on a global scale, youth involvement will be 
limited to unproductive demonstrations instead of 
powerful movements’ (Fredericks 2010).
Such barriers to meaningful participation may also 
be reflected in the institutional structures through which 
various national youth policies organize participation 
processes. Policies may embrace models that to varying 
degrees transfer control and power to youth (United 
Nations 2003). In practice, levels of youth engagement 
range from manipulation and tokenism at one end, to 
full-fledged youth-designed and implemented program-
matic responses at the other (United Nations 2005). 
Levels of participation may be distinguished as follows 
(Youth Employment Network undated): 
 • Level 1 – Information providing: youth are informed 
of the policy and activities that have been decided on 
by decision-makers.
 • Level 2 – Consulting, decision-maker-initiated: deci-
sion-makers decide when and on which topics youth 
are consulted.
 • Level 3 – Consulting, youth-initiated: youth can put 
subjects forward, but have no decision-making 
powers.
 • Level 4 – Shared decision-making or co-management: 
elders and young people share decision-making 
powers.
 • Level 5 – Autonomy: young people take initiative and 
conduct projects themselves.
Moreover, governments can grant different participa-
tion statuses to youth organizations, with attendant 
‘stages’ of involvement (Figure 1).
Efforts to include youth in decision-making must also 
recognize the changes occurring in the nature and struc-
ture of youth movements. Accordingly, governments and 
international organizations could seek to work with a 
broad range of the youth sub-populations, including 
those in formal youth organizations and those who are 
Figure 1. A stage and status model of youth participation in policymaking processes 
Stage Status
Getting a foot in the door
Lobbying and campaigning for social change
Recognition
Getting into the room
Partnership and networking models for successful youth participation
Partnership
Getting a permanent seas at the table
Capacity building and skills development to participate effectively and to create sustain-
able partnerships
Participation
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not. These should take into consideration emerging 
structural forms based on networks of collaboration and 
common interests. One example that seems to reverse 
the decline in traditional participation and civic engage-
ment by youth is internet-based activities. Such new 
modes of participation may provide novel and additional 
opportunities for more young people to become active 
in decision-making and in shaping their societies (United 
Nations 2005, p.52).
The structures of participation are likely to have impor-
tant implications for the influence that young people 
can wield in policy processes and in affecting their 
outcomes and impacts. However, evidence on these is 
not well documented. Thus, the UN’s World Youth Report 
noted that there had been too little independent evalu-
ation of youth participation and its direct impact on the 
young people themselves and on other elements of 
society including legal and policy reforms, public aware-
ness of children’s and young people’s rights, community 
improvements, and service provision for young people 
(United Nations 2003, p.285). Information on basic indica-
tors for international comparisons is not available. 
According to the United Nations (2005) these might 
include:
 • The level  of  youth par t icipation in local 
decision-making 
 • The number or percentage of young people who vote 
in national and local elections 
 • The level of participation in school governance 
 • The right to and level of freedom of association for 
young people 
This brief, selective review comes to similar conclu-
sions. The normative argument for the desirability of 
youth participation in policy processes is often mixed 
up with thin supportive evidence. A better understanding 
of the nature and effects of youth participation thus 
requires a much harder empirical look at the dynamics 
of policy processes, with specific attention to aspects 
such as power, politics, discourses and diversity of repre-
sentation. As the next section will show, some conceptual 
approaches to policy process are more suited to this task 
than others.
Further unpacking youth policy processes
The way in which the policy process is conceptualized 
strongly steers the type of research questions that are 
asked about youth within these processes. In this respect 
it is useful to briefly distinguish the traditional stages 
model of the policy process from alternative 
conceptualizations. 
The stages model essentially considers that the policy 
process is made up of a sequence or cycle of successive 
stages. Usually these are set-out as: agenda setting; policy 
formation (policy formulation and decision-making); 
implementation and evaluation. This model is rooted in 
a normative understanding of the separated nature of 
Western democratic institutions. It assumes a hierarchy, 
with a primacy of politics over, and its separation from 
administration (Hill and Hupe 2009). It posits the policy 
process as a rational and technocratic problem solving 
exercise, where values are exogenous: thus, politicians 
decide, and the bureaucracy executes policy. Here, scien-
tific knowledge is seen to allow politicians to make better 
decisions, i.e. ‘truth speaks to power’ (Burton 2006). It 
considers a quite strict separation of state and society 
– where the latter only provide inputs through the elec-
tion of politicians but are otherwise standing at a distance 
from the policy process. Whilst this model has been much 
critique for its empirical lack of fit, the linearity and lack 
of explanatory potential (e.g. Howlett and Ramesh 1998; 
John 1998; Sabatier 2007), as a heuristic device it is widely 
used and is reflected in commonly held beliefs about 
the policy process (deLeon 1999; Hill 2009). 
Yet, the stages model is not particular useful if we 
want to understand the contested nature of policy 
processes. Alternative conceptualizations of the policy 
process emphasise the relationship between knowledge, 
power and policy; processes of bargaining; the social 
construction of policy problems and solutions through 
particular narratives, framings and discourses that are 
furthered by particular social and state actors, actor-
networks and coalitions, and the roles of ideas, interests, 
values and beliefs in these. 
Two such approaches concern the Advocacy Coalitions 
Framework and a set of ‘argumentative turn’ analyses. 
Whilst having distinct epistemological positions, they 
both emphasise the importance of understanding inter-
actions between state and societal actors throughout 
the policy process. The argumentative turn in policy 
studies comprises a range of analyses (e.g. Hajer, Roe, 
Fischer and Forrester, etc.) grounded in a constructivist 
epistemology. They share a concern with the role of 
power in policy processes; its relation to discursively 
produced knowledge and an outspoken normative 
concern with strengthening deliberative democracy. 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith use a neo-positivist episte-
mology. They argue that their Advocacy Coalition 
Framework offers an alternative view of the policy 
process, with a particular emphasis on explaining policy 
change. The ACF particularly focuses on strong interac-
tions between coalitions of state and non-state actors 
grounded in particular sets of beliefs/values that shape 
the way in which these actors construct social problems 
and attendant solutions.
Such alternative conceptualizations of the policy 
process are better suited to address questions about the 
dynamic nature of ‘youth’ as an object of policy, and as 
subjects within these processes. They allow us to focus 
on questions such as: who is a ‘youth’? Why is this defined 
in such different ways in different places? Why are some 
issues ‘youth issues’ and others not? What is the role of 
particular constellations of actors within and outside the 
state in these processes? 
Moreover, such ‘non-stagist’ approaches are better 
able to deal with the move ‘from government to gover-
nance’ – as reflected in the enormous changes in and 
the growing complexity of governance arrangements 
seen over the last three decades. These involve, firstly, 
the growing complexity and intertwining of state, 
market, and voluntary arrangements. Secondly, the shift 
in the locus of decision-making away from central 
governments: upward (global or regional institutions: 
e.g. WTO; UNFCC; African Union; EU); downward 
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(decentralisation) and sideways (involvement of private 
and non-profit sectors in public service delivery) (Pierre 
and Guy Peters 2000). Thirdly, the consequent growth 
in the type and number of non-state actors and their 
varied roles in decision-making and delivery processes. 
However, in the documents reviewed for this paper, 
in particular those relating to international organizations, 
it is not unusual that discussions about youth in policy 
processes reflect the stages model of policy processes9, 
although some attention is given to the involvement of 
young people in lobbying, advocacy, research, etc 
(United Nations 2003). Take for instance some of the 
better documented advocacy efforts of youth groups 
that are part of the Youth Employment Network (YEN). 
YEN is a collaboration of the ILO, the UN and the World 
Bank that attempts to give youth employment issues 
more prominence in policy agendas, and for countries 
to commit to certain principles and become Lead 
Members of the network. YEN is active in many devel-
oping countries, and successfully works together with 
local youth organizations. Several countries have ‘joined 
the network primarily through the lobbying work of 
active youth, who armed with the facts presented strong 
cases to senior officials in their countries, outlining 
existing and unmet commitments and convinced their 
governments of the urgency of action on youth employ-
ment’ (Youth Employment Network undated, p.23). Thus, 
in Georgia it was an active member of the Scout 
Movement, in Iran and Rwanda country co-ordinators 
of the international civil society organisation and YEN 
partner, the Youth Employment Summit (YES) Campaign. 
In Nigeria it was largely the result of persistent lobbying 
by a young civil society activist (Youth Employment 
Network undated). Three cases of YEN in sub-Saharan 
Africa are presented below.
Case 1: Congo DRC
YWCA-Congo has been leading an extensive lobbying 
campaign since 2004. It has also partnered with a number 
of youth organizations to form a national coalition on 
youth employment which has continued to lobby the 
Congo DRC Government to move on its commitment as 
a YEN Lead Country and to develop a National Action 
Plan. The coalition has reached out to stakeholders via 
print media and radio, though seminars, through a recent 
survey on youth attitudes to work, and through meetings 
with government ministers. As a result of these interven-
tions, youth employment has risen up the political 
agenda. Most recently the YEN’s Core Agencies – the ILO, 
the UN and the World Bank’s offices in Congo DRC – have 
come together to develop a joint proposal to support 
to the Ministry of Labour in developing a National Action 
Plan (Youth Employment Network undated, p.23).
Case 2: Ghana 
The YES Ghana Network, in partnership with other 
Ghanaian youth and civil society organisations, has been 
carrying out a major advocacy campaign to alert the 
government of Ghana to the importance of the youth 
employment issue and to highlight the need for a 
comprehensive youth employment strategy for the 
country. They have urged the Government to step 
forward to join as a Lead Country of the YEN. This 
campaign has involved a series of events and meetings 
with youth organisations, the World Bank and the UNDP, 
as well as awareness raising activities with the media 
(Youth Employment Network undated, p.26).
Case 3: Namibia 
The Government of Namibia, led by the Ministry of Youth 
National Service, Sport and Culture, established a 
National Task Force on Youth Employment in 2004.The 
Task Force includes representatives of the Government, 
international institutions, worker and employer organisa-
tions, civil society and youth groups, including the 
National Youth Council. It was given the task of devel-
oping Namibia’s National Action Plan on youth employ-
ment. Based on the work of the Task Force, the Ministry 
developed a preliminary outline for the NAP in December 
2005, outlining a variety of Government-supported initia-
tives. However, between 2004 and 2008 progress towards 
finalizing and implementing the NAP stalled (Youth 
Employment Network undated, p.30).
Each of the cases above clearly suggests the existence 
of actor networks. However, actual analysis of the nature, 
extent, means and dynamics through which policy influ-
ence was (or failed to be) established, the experiences 
of modes of participation and actual policy outcomes 
and impacts achieved is very limited.
Accordingly, ‘non-stage’ approaches suggest a range 
of questions that could be fruitfully explored to obtain 
a better understanding of youth in policy processes. 
These include:
Emergence of youth policies
 • How can we explain the explosion of youth policies 
during the 1990s and 2000s throughout much of sub-
Saharan Africa? 
 • How distinct are various country policies (in SSA) in 
terms of objectives, instruments, institutional struc-
tures and policy visions?
Impacts
 • What are the achievements and failures of youth poli-
cies, with reference to stated objectives; unintended 
outcomes; and youth wellbeing in general?
 • How successful have youth policies been in improving 
developmental outcomes for marginalised sub-
groups within a wider youth population?
 • In cases where young people have felt to have mean-
ingfully engaged in policy processes, has this been 
accompanied with attitudinal changes amongst adult 
decision-makers about youth participation? 
Structures and experiences of participation
 • What structures, ‘formulas’ for and terms under which 
participation occurs have enabled high levels of youth 
engagement in, inputs to and where relevant, control 
over deliberative and decision-making processes? 
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 • Where these have been initiated, what processes facili-
tated their emergence and sanction?
 • Where youth participation occurs, who is it that partici-
pates, and to what extent social, economic, gender, 
and other profiles represent divergent and vulnerable 
youth populations?
Levels of a staged policy process
 • Where youth organisations have been involved in the 
implementation of government policies, has this been 
a route through which influence on decision-making 
could be achieved? If so, why (not) and how?
Role of knowledge
 • What evidence exists of young people having success-
fully produced new forms of knowledge that have 
been influential in changing youth policies?
 • What evidence do we have of a posited disconnect in 
knowledge of youth issues amongst adults and youth 
themselves? Are there issues that are particularly sensi-
tive to this?
Discourses, narratives, storylines and framings
 • What narratives of youth (participation) in policy 
processes are used by different actors within govern-
ment (from multilateral donors to local governments) 
and outside government? How do these compare to 
narratives used by sub-groups of youth themselves, 
a shown in their various organisations and efforts at 
collective action?
 • How can we explain the various framings and defini-
tions of ‘youth’ across countries, and within these? 
 • Through what kind of processes do particular framings 
of youth and youth issues become dominant, lodged 
in official policy discourses?
 • Do such processes obscure other issues that could be 
of relevance? 
Actors and actor networks
 • Who are the actors that are involved in different levels 
of youth-related policy processes (agenda-setting; 
policy formulation; implementation; evaluation; etc)?
 • What is the role of multilateral and bilateral interna-
tional donors – and do these differ significantly in 
contexts of varying aid dependencies?
 • Is there evidence of actor networks or advocacy coali-
tions that successfully engage in long-term coordina-
tion of action to influence policymaking? What roles 
do ideas, interests and values/beliefs play? 
 • Can examples be found where actor networks that 
involve or are led by youth organisations have achieved 
policy influence? What role was there for actors within 
the media, academia, civil society, bureaucracies and 
politics?
 • Within national and cross-national contexts, what roles 
were played by policy entrepreneurs and or critical 
events in changing youth policies? 
Other question: 
 • How do the intricacies of defining youth (different 
age-based as well as more socio-anthropological defi-
nitions) affect what aspects of political mobilisation 
and engagement in policy processes are made 
possible and (in)visible? 
Youth politics outside policy processes?
Finally, questions may be asked to what extent and in 
what ways do particular conceptualisations of policy 
processes fail to engage with certain forms of youth 
politics that have important implications for youth well-
being and possibly also for youth policies? 
Theorisations of the policy process are firmly 
embedded in western notions of liberal democracy and 
modern states. Discussions of the postcolonial state have 
long assumed that post-independence African countries 
carried forward colonial institutions and practices organ-
ised around principles of the modern state and rational 
Weberian bureaucracies. However, there is a growing 
recognition that the dynamics of state formation in sub-
Saharan Africa are distinct from such liberal democratic 
models/ideal types. One important challenge is the 
importance and extent of neo-patrimonialism (e.g. 
Chabal and Daloz 1999) as a key driver of state formation. 
Moreover, Frederiksen’s study of the Mungiki youth group 
in Kenya notes the importance in Africa of alternative, 
non-civic forms of politics, often driven by disenfran-
chised youth (referred to as ‘lumpen’ and ‘rebels’) who 
are excluded from and opposed to formal politics 
(Frederiksen 2010). In this vein, Watts has noted the 
critical role of youth organizations in the violent politics 
of oil in the Niger Delta, and demonstrates that their role 
is certainly not limited to simply acting on adults’ instruc-
tions (Watts 2003). Many other examples can be given 
in this respect (e.g. Richards 1996). 
This raises the question how well contemporary 
conceptualizations of the policy process are able to 
capture these types of youth politics, or conversely, how 
notions devised to analyse these politics (for instance, 
‘public authority’ (Lund 2006) and ‘political society’ 
(Chatterjee 2004)) relate to the former. 
Whilst these certainly warrant analysis, it may however 
be useful to point out that these may not be the only 
dynamics worthy of attention, and that the analysis of 
policy process can still make valuable contributions to 
our understanding of (aspects of ) state formation 
processes. Thus, Gould’s study of a coalition of various 
churches, NGOs and lawyers in constitution-making 
processes in Zambia highlight the importance of particu-
larly framed liberal notions of the rule of law (Gould 2006). 
Finally, Kallio and Hakli’s discussion of child politics 
raises a fundamental question. They note that what is 
meant by ‘the political’ is often left unspecified or is 
defined in terms of events or topics that are deemed 
politically significant from an adult perspective (Kallio and 
Hakli 2010). Accordingly, the suggestion is that there is 
a realm of politics happening in addition to, and with 
some linkages with, adult politics. Key conceptual issues 
including the meanings of ‘children’s politics’ and ‘chil-
dren’s political agency’ remain unresolved. These authors 
hence argue that more work is needed to clarify the 
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concept of politics as it relates to children, and as 
emerging in the specific contexts of childhood. Could a 
similar argument be made for sub-groups of youth, or 
youth in its entirety? Some studies of youth culture in 
global cities certainly suggest that distinct groups of 
youth, such as the ‘educated unemployed’ (Jeffrey 2010) 
or ‘urban loafers’ in Tanzania (Weiss 2009) are engaged 
in producing new and distinct forms of meaning and 
geographies, and that this involves various class, gender, 
and other forms of politics. Accordingly, this raises further 
questions about how comparable or how distinct youth 
politics and youth political agency may be from adult 
politics. 
End Notes 
1 A notable exception is Zambia where neoliberal 
economic during the 1990s led to a lack of employment 
and massive public disinvestment in education, 
resulting in a dramatic decline in human capital: the 
young in Zambia are now less-educated than older 
groups (World Bank 2005a).
2 But note that Urdal and Hoelscher’s study of 55 cities 
rejects the argument that youth bulges and 
unemployment are likely to lead to political and social 
disturbances (Urdal and Hoelscher, 2009).  
3 As for instance illustrated by a measure for transition 
like the duration of the period between youth’s end of 
education and first paid work (Garcia and Fares, 2008).
4 Moreover, significant variations occur by gender 
(often, young men stay in school longer, achieve higher 
qualifications and start working later than women), and 
location (urban youth start working later and achieve 
higher educational attainment than rural youth) (Garcia 
and Fares, 2008).
5 The status of its ratification is not known to the 
researcher.
6 http://social.un.org/youthyear/, accessed 29 
November 2010.
7 For instance, Tele-democracy is a Finnish internet-
based channel for influencing local matters, which 
includes the Idea Factory. This gives local youth an 
opportunity to share their views with the governing 
authorities of their city. An idea submitted is for 
discussion on the Internet turned into a practical 
motion by a moderator and then taken to the local 
Youth Council, which in turn hands it over to the 
governing body of the locality. Source: European 
Commission (2001): Study on the State of Young People 
and National Youth Policy in Europe. Part 1 (Executive 
Summary) IARD, in: (UNESCO 2004), p.30. 
8 The process of drafting the Charter itself was started 
by the Human Sciences Research Council of South 
Africa upon invitation, and followed by national 
consultations with youth at country level, while in May 
2006 the African Union convened a Youth Forum, a 
youth expert’s meeting and a Ministers of Youth 
meeting as part of the review process (Panday 2006).
9 For instance, this is reflected in a recognition that 
young people are active in ‘Programme design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation’ (United 
Nations 2003), p.280, or when emphasising youth 
involvement in setting national policy, in ‘the next step’ 
of drafting action plans, and subsequently carrying out 
specific projects (UNESCO 2004), p.24.
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